Washington consensus policies evolved over time, both in Washington and among Latin
Washington Consensus interchangeably with neoliberalism. Critics have infused both terms with assumptions about Washington's rigid ideological adherence to market fundamentalism.
Through the 1980s, Latin American governments and civil society resisted market liberalization; then eventually supported it with varying degrees of enthusiasm. By the early 2000s, governments faced powerful domestic opposition leading to significant, though not fundamental, alterations in policy direction. Despite what many observers believe to be some major changes, Washington Consensus policies remain resolutely resilient in the region, a reality reflective of the evolution of Washington Consensus ideas, the impact of reforms on domestic power structures, and the structural realities of the global economy. I begin by identifying the original Washington Consensus policies and then discuss the way the Consensus evolved in official Washington thinking through the 1990s. The following sections explore the debates regarding how and why market liberalizing policy prescriptions took hold in the region and the rise to power of left regimes that challenged neoliberalism. I identify two shortcomings in much of the scholarly literature. One is the general failure to recognize the early and strong popular resistance to the original Washington consensus policies; the other is a general neglect of the way in which neoliberal restructuring increased the power of domestic business interests. This latter development has contributed to the re-emergence of some of the original Washington Consensus policies.
The Evolution of Washington Consensus Policies in Washington
The term Washington consensus originated in a paper prepared by economist John Williamson in 1989 . In this work, Williamson listed ten policies he felt were being implemented widely in Latin America at the time and about which he felt there was a reasonable degree of consensus in Washington (Williamson, 1990) . The original list included fiscal discipline, the redirection of public spending away from (indiscriminate) subsidies toward spending on health and education, tax reform directed at broadening the tax base with a moderate marginal tax rate, market-determined and positive interest rates, a competitive exchange rate to encourage exports, trade liberalization, liberalization of foreign direct investment regimes, privatization, and, deregulation. Deregulation included, among other items, the establishment of property rights, the elimination of price controls, and restrictions on the remittance of profits. Washington Consensus ideas reflected a turn to neoclassical economic thinking and a rejection of the Keynesian interventionist principles that had dominated the pre-war period. The overriding objective was to roll back the state and strengthen the role of the market.
The new policy direction gained momentum with the election of Ronald Reagan as U.S. Washington Consensus policies on highly indebted Latin American countries. With growing expenditure needs and the availability of loans from international banks through the 1970s, Latin American countries, particularly the largest ones (Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico), had incurred substantial foreign debts. When commodity prices declined, and interest rates began to rise in the early 1980s, economic conditions worsened. The Mexican decision to stop payments on its foreign debt triggered panic among the private banks, which refused new lending and the renegotiation of old loans, sending Latin American economies into a downward spiral. Faced with balance of payments crises, country after country signed Stabilization Agreements with the IMF, followed (from the mid-1980s) by Structural Adjustment Agreements with the World Bank.
Since these loan arrangements involved country officials agreeing to Washington Consensus policy conditions in exchange for loans, some observers have identified policy conditionality, particularly from 1989 when the Brady Plan offered debt relief in exchange for prior commitment to reforms, as playing a role in the durability of what was understood as politically unpopular reforms (Remmer, 1998, p. 22; Ramamurti 1992, pp. 164-165) . Others, however, have suggested that IFI influence on policy reform emanated from other, more subtle activities, such as the IFI's role in the transfer of policy ideas to country officials during years of policy discussions or by means of support for country officials already predisposed to reform (Kahler, 1992, p. 123; Nelson, 1992, p. 314) .
As growth and prosperity failed to materialize through the 1980s, Washington policy elites supplemented the original policy list with a recommendation for financial opening to attract foreign savings to spur economic growth (Berr, 2007) . The results, however, were disappointing. Between 1991 and 2002, the GDP of the region grew at only .9 percent per year while during the 1970s, it had grown at the rate of 3.2 percent (Bresser-Pereira & Varela, 2004-5) . High interest rates, designed to attract the inflow of capital, combined with overvalued exchange rates (likely linked to the high capital inflows), contributed to the contraction of domestic savings and investment and stagnation in economic growth. Some observers maintained that liberalization of the capital account was responsible for increased economic volatility and financial crises (Stiglitz, 2000) .
The glory days of the original Washington consensus (from about 1990 to approximately the late 1990s) were short-lived. Economic stagnation, repeated financial crises (Mexico in 1994 /5, Brazil in 1999 , and Argentina 2001 , and rising inequality constituted mounting evidence of the inadequacies of Washington Consensus policies. Several prominent mainstream economists raised criticisms, suggesting that official thinking had disregarded issues of poverty, inequality, and the need for state intervention to mitigate market imperfections.
1 However, 6 increasingly vociferous Latin American civil society criticisms of IFI polices was also important in driving change in official thinking. Claims that economic reforms had been implemented in an exclusionary fashion and had contributed to social deprivation were important in pushing the World Bank towards a stronger focus on poverty reduction, support for expanding social expenditures, a concern for increased civil society participation in Bank projects, and support for debt relief for highly indebted poor countries.
This re-thinking produced an Augmented Washington Consensus (also referred to as the Post-Washington Consensus, Second Generation Reforms, and Inclusive Neoliberalism). The
World Bank placed special emphasis on spending on health and education, part of the original consensus but lost sight of due to the pressure to reduce Latin American government spending to facilitate payments on debt (Kapur, Lewis, & Webb, 1997, p. 607 ). An additional ingredient was social programs targeted to the poorest citizens. The IFIs also gave increased attention to labor flexibilization (only mentioned in passing in the original list), claiming that revision of labor codes making it easier to hire and fire would increase investment and employment expansion.
Privatization moved into calls for careful regulation of privatized companies and for social security privatization. Institution building, and decentralization were added to the agenda. Civil society participation became especially important to the World Bank as it served the dual purpose of ensuring country ownership (support for) the original and augmented policy agenda while responding to civil society demands for involvement in policy development.
Through the 1990s, the World Bank quickly developed organizational mechanisms to facilitate civil society consultation giving rise to research focusing on these efforts in Latin America, much of it criticizing the selective and shallow nature of consultations (Acuña & Tuozzo, 2000; Teichman, 2007 in accordance with IFI's predilection for highly targeted social programs (particularly conditional cash transfer programs) 2 poverty reduction strategies made these the center piece of poverty reduction. Dissatisfied with the IFI consultative process, civil society organizations carried out parallel consultation processes producing documents that were sharply critical of their exclusion from the discussion of macroeconomic policy and critical of privatization of public utilities (Ruckert, 2010, p. 128 ).
Resistance to market liberalization was a hallmark of the market reform process in the region from its inception. Intense political struggles shaped the specific nature of reform outcomes with implications for reform sustainability.
Market Liberalization: From Resistance to Acceptance

Politics and Resistance to Market Reforms
Prior to the debt crisis of the early 1980s, the IMF signed Standby Agreements, involving devaluation, restrictions on public expenditures, credit and wages, the removal of restrictions on foreign investment, and occasionally the reduction of trade protection, with several Latin American countries, including Chile and Argentina (Marshall S., Mardones S., & Marshall L., 1983, pp. 279-284) . However, fierce political resistance, particularly from labor, meant that countries failed to adhere to these policies for any length of time. (Kurtz, 2001, pp. 5, 7) and it retained ownership of CODELCO, the country's biggest copper producer and an important foreign exchange earner. The unity of the military and its control by Pinochet along with the ability and willingness of the regime to support a group of highly committed market reform technocrats, were essential ingredients in accounting for the rapid and extensive nature of reform. The nationalist bent of the military accounts for the fact that privatization excluded the state-owned copper company while the survival of statist bureaucrats explains state policies in support of new exports (Teichman, 2001, p. 76) . The repressive nature of the regime, which was able to demobilize labor resistance, was central to bringing about labor flexibilization and social security reform-reforms that were not contemplated until well into the 1990s elsewhere in the region. In
Argentina, under military rule between 1976 and 1983, the government carried out some market liberalizing reforms but progress was erratic. With stiff opposition from nationalists within the military and with the greater relative strength of the labor movement, privatization was minimal, and tariff reduction was highly selective. Both privatization and tariff reform avoided any impact on state-owned companies engaged in the production of military-related material and in areas of interest to the military such as transportation, cement, and steel (Dornbusch and de Pablo, 1990, 123; Manzetti, 1991, p. 131 ).
In the wake of transitions to democracy in the early to mid-1980s, market liberalization was fiercely resisted. Not only had market liberalization become associated with military governments, but new democracies faced rising expectations for improvements in living standards. Governments therefore rejected the orthodox prescriptions recommended by the IFIs in favor of heterodox programs involving a mixture of orthodox and state-interventionist policies. Administrations pursing heterodox programs included that of Raúl Alfonsín (Argentina, 1983 (Argentina, -1989 , who combined wage and price freezes with tariff reductions and public enterprise restructuring. Heterodox programs were also pursued by Peru's Alan García (1985-90), Bolivian President Hernán Siles Zuazo , and Brazil's President José Sarney (1985 Sarney ( -1989 . All of these heterodox programs failed.
Overcoming Resistance: Scholarly Debates
Hence, even though the debt crisis placed market reform on the agenda, Washington
Consensus policies would not "stick" until the 1990s. This history of resistance to neoliberal policy reform, followed by its eventual adoption, resulted in the emergence of a large body of scholarly research explaining why countries finally succumbed to market liberalization. The literature is loosely divided between those who focus on the authoritarian/top-down, even coercive aspect of the process, and those who highlight the fact that most reforms were carried forward under electoral democracies in contexts in which public opinion was won over to the new reform program. Further, while there is general scholarly agreement on what factors played a role in bringing about adherence to Washington Consensus dictates, there is little consensus on their relative importance.
Some regard the economic crises that occurred in the wake of failed heterodox programs, particularly high inflation, as important, even essential, in triggering policy change due to its ability to break down both elite and public resistance to reform and facilitate the centralization of power (Armijo & Faucher, 2002; Weyland, 2001) . Hyperinflation preceded the implementation of market liberalizing reforms in most cases: it reached over 300 percent in Chile in 1975, over 8000 percent in Bolivia in 1985, over 1000 percent in Argentina and Brazil in 1990, and over 7000 percent in Peru in 1990. According to this argument, the depth of economic crises produced a strong incentive among leaderships to implement policy reforms because all alternatives had been exhausted. Meanwhile, the population, even in contexts where most people had voted against market reform candidates, were persuaded that there was no other option.
While some viewed this development as an integral part of the democratic process, others took a more skeptical position, focusing on Latin America's authoritarian legacies, such as its long tradition of personalistic leadership, a feature that afforded leaders with loyal supporters and the authority to override institutional arrangements. Hence, leaders with charismatic populist appeal and personally loyal support bases, such as Carlos Menem in Argentina, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, and Andrés Pérez in Venezuela, ran for election on vague populist platforms opposed to market liberalization. However, once elected and faced with economic crises, they adopted market liberalization programs. A critical view (Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler, 1999 ) sees these leaders as having misled the public while an alternative perspective takes a more sympathetic stand, arguing that strong loyalty simply translated into trust in leaders, who violated campaign promises in a sincere pursuit of good outcomes (Stokes, 2001 ).
Once securing executive power, market reform presidents, faced with resistance from their legislatures, often used constitutionally sanctioned presidential decree powers (powers intended for emergency situations) to avoid the protracted process of securing approval for market reforms (Geddes, 1994; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995) . Market reforms were passed by presidential decree in Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia. Bolivian President Paz Estenssoro also declared a ninety day "state of siege/emergency" which suspended constitutional guarantees and gave the President the power to use the military to repress protesters (Conaghan, 1994, p. 258) .
In 1992, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori engaged in a "self-coup" in which he closed congress, assumed dictatorial powers, and passed market reform legislation.
Another important body of literature focusing on the top-down nature of the process stresses the importance of insulating policymakers from societal interests, particularly those who would oppose the reform, particularly the organized working and middle classes, who had received generous wage and benefit settlements in the past. Hence, this perspective characterized successful market reform countries as cases in which authority had been heavily centralized and "insulated" from political pressures (Cavarozzi, Nelson, and Urrutia, 1992, p. 18; Haggard & Webb, 1994, p. 14; Morales, 1996, p. 16; Nelson, 1992, p. 111) . One analysis concludes that Latin American market liberalizing regimes were democratic in name only and involved the "political exclusion" of all potential sources of opposition (Contreras Osorio 2003, 53) . A common, and ultimately mistaken belief was that a reform process involving this type of policy insulation would produce an outcome benefitting the unorganized and less-well of part of the population.
In successful cases of market reform, researchers also argued that policy insulation was effectively bolstered by the installation of a highly committed and cohesive teams of market reform technocrats. These individuals with graduate degrees, often from U.S. universities in subjects such as economics, were central actors in policy reform (Conaghan and Malloy, 1994, pp. 145-148; Williamson & Haggard, 1994) . Rising to predominance within state bureaucracies, technocrats, when allied with politicians who were considered personalist leaders and political outsiders (Carlos Menem in Argentina and Alberto Fujimori in Peru), could become a formidable force for market liberalizing policy change (Panizza, 2013, p. 90; Teichman, 2001, p. 114) . A final top-down exclusionary aspect of the market reform process was the fact that market reform politicians and technocrats secured their countries' business support by ensuring that already powerful businesses were the biggest beneficiaries of the market reform process. Domestic businesses were given favorable terms in the purchase public companies (Schamis, 1999, p. 265) and they were provided tax and other advantages to support their expansion into export markets (Teichman 2001, 144-146) . In this way, as market reform progressed, a powerful new class of exporters became strong supporters of the new economic policy direction (Díaz, 1997, p. 45; Przeworksi, 1991, p. 142) .
Others, however, characterize the process of policy reform as a more pluralistic process. Biglaiser and DeRouen (2004) , for example, found that the presence of party fragmentation with its attendant ideological and political polarization, gave opposition parties the opportunity to impede reform progress even in contexts of economic crisis. Successful reform also involved political leaders cultivating support from ruling party members in ways that won over resisters.
According to Corrales (2002) , the failure to cultivate and win over support from party members was instrumental in the acrimonious relationship between the Action Democratic Party (AD) and the executive and the collapse of the market reform program in Venezuela. Meanwhile, the leadership's cultivation of the Peronist party helps account for the success of achieving reform in Argentina.
Others point out that market reformers engaged in coalition building, taking measures to secure support from potential opposition groups. Carlos Menem, for example, won over labor leaders by providing them with government appointments and by providing targeted wage increases. The Argentine government also offered employees of privatized companies the opportunity to purchase shares in privatized companies at subsidized prices (Murillo, 2001, p. 486) . Political leaders provided various types of compensation, in the form of subsides and guaranteed market shares, to industrialists threatened by trade liberalization (Etchemendy 2011) .
Some scholars maintain that there was considerable popular support for market liberalizing policies, especially among lower socio-economic groups, due to the fact that stabilization policies reduced high inflation rates that were harmed the poor the most. Armijo and Faucher (2002) point out that 10 of 14 elections brought avowed market reformers to power (pp. 27, 29).
In Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua, Spalding cites opinion surveys that showed over 70 percent of the population supported market reforms during the 1990s, as assistance from the U.S. flowed in and economic growth resumed (2014, pp. 42, 45, 52) .
Whether one saw the process as having been a top down one, or one with generally widespread public support, most scholarship assumed that market reforms would remain firmly entrenched because the power of past opponents, particularly trade unions, had been reduced and/or coopted during the years of liberalization. Civil society was no longer seen as a threat to the new economic direction because it had become deeply fragmented. It was unlikely, therefore, that popular groups would coalesce around opposition to market reform (Kurtz 2004, 134; Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler 1999, 31) . This perspective underestimated the ongoing fierce resistance of popular organizations to neoliberal reform, an issue addressed in the next section.
While virtually all countries had embarked on market liberalization programs, there were differences in the depth and extensiveness of reform achievements. Trade and financial liberalization generally went forward as did tax reforms involving an expansion of value added taxation, a reduction in taxation on company profits, and tax incentives in mining, forestry, and tourism. Privatization of public companies, especially in energy, was the area where there was the greatest variation. Nationalist opposition stalled full privatization of Bolivia's state oil company and kept oil companies in state hands in Venezuela and Mexico. In Venezuela,
Uruguay and Mexico electricity was not privatized (Lora, 2001, pp. 15-18) . By the late 1990s, For many observers, who had anticipated the consolidation of neoliberal reforms, this was an unexpected development. In hindsight, however, the rise in opposition to market reform is not difficult to understand. The short-term pain of these reforms was more severe than originally anticipated and the expected gains did not materialize. Poverty increased from 26.7
percent of the population to 31 percent between 1980 and 1989 for the region as a whole (Psacharopoulos et al., 1995, p. 246) . The massive layoffs of the 1980s resulted in the decline of formal employment and an expansion of the informal sector as employment generation lagged.
Moreover, poverty reduction stagnated during the 1990s and was subject to reversals when economic crises hit. In the view of Chilean economist, Ricardo Ffrench-Davis (2005), neoliberal fundamentalism, with its preoccupation with financial liberalization and indiscriminate trade liberalization, had produced unsatisfactory results both in terms of economic growth and equity.
While the 1998 Latinobarómetro survey found that 64 percent of Latin Americans agreed that the "market economy" was best for the country, public support for market liberalization, particularly privatization, was probably thinner than originally recognized. The 1995 survey
shows that a majority of Latin Americans believed that health services (71 percent), pensions (68 percent), telephone services (52 percent), petroleum (63 percent) and water (64 percent) should be in the majority hands of the state while the 2006 survey indicates a strong preference for significant state involvement in the market since a majority (55.8 percent) of Latin Americans believe the state must be a major actor in the production of wealth (Corporación Latinobarómetro, 1995 . Furthermore, while opposition to neoliberal reform gained momentum from the late 1990s and increasingly became the subject of scholarly concern, popular mobilization was, in fact, a constant feature of the politics of market reform from the mid-1980s-a reality ignored by those (largely English-language) scholars who concluded that a new market consensus had emerged.
A collection of case studies documents this intense, early, and widespread resistance to neoliberal reform in the region (Rojas Villagra, 2015) . In Bolivia, for example, labor organizations vigorously protested the tough economic reform program introduced in 1985 and continued to resist through the 1980s. Organized labor was joined during the following years by new groups of actors (coca growers, peasants, and indigenous organizations) who took over leadership of the resistance, even as the labor movement was weakened by massive layoffs (Chaplin, 2010) . After 1990, indigenous and popular resistance in Ecuador and Bolivia expanded. In 1989, in Venezuela widespread protests (known as the Caracazo) against economic reforms occurred. In Argentina, the Piquetero movement of unemployed workers, many laid off due to economic restructuring, led protests in Argentina from the mid-1990s. Strikes and worker demonstrations against public enterprise restructurings and privatizations were widespread in Mexico through the 1980s and into the 1990s.
However, it was not just popular resistance that made it possible for left regimes to rise to power and address the social deficit. A fundamental change in the global economy-the rise of China as a major player-created the conditions that facilitated the ability of these regimes to address issues of social deprivation. The increased demand emanating from China for resource commodities was instrumental in stimulating economic growth and the revenue that enabled left governments to improve welfare. China has become the region's second highest export market.
Between 2000 and 2013, Latin America's trade with China rose 27 percent (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2018, p. 8) . In seven Latin American countries, China surpassed the United States as the main destination for exports (Naylor, 2017) .
Many Latin American countries have become highly natural resource dependent: over 90 percent of the exports of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela are natural resources, while over 60 percent of the value of exports from Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, and
Uruguay are some combination of fuel, minerals, and agricultural products (Ocampo, 2017) . 4 Indeed, the centrality of the commodity boom to post-neoliberalism and the role of China in facilitating increased investment and spending has prompted the term "Commodity Consensus"
and even "Beijing Consensus" to describe this phase of Latin American development-this latter a nod to the growing importance of the state's role and the fact that the more radical versions of post-neoliberalism in the region have sometimes played fast and loose with liberal democracy and human rights, as I discuss in the next section.
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Debates and Issues in Post-Neoliberalism
A substantial body of scholarly literature addresses the differences among the left antineoliberal regimes that came to power in the 2000s. In three cases where left parties opposed to market reforms during the heyday of neoliberal reform, were elected, and remained true to their original campaign promises to mitigate what they viewed to be the worst inadequacies of market policies (Chile, Uruguay and Brazil), party system stability remained intact and the new regimes were generally moderate in their anti-neoliberal stances. In three cases where left populist leaders opposed market reforms and then supported these reforms once elected, new anti-system leaders and movements arose, and traditional party systems declined. These regimes were radical in their opposition to market policies. Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have been the most widely discussed cases in this category. In Argentina, however, the Peronist party discarded its earlier pro market reform stance, returned to its populist left roots, advocated a strong antineoliberal stance, and was elected. In Costa Rica, the party system remained intact and no antisystem party rose to power even though the traditional left party had made a sharp turn to neoliberal policies. That party was returned to power, but it did mitigate its earlier pro neo-liberal stance. 6 In Nicaragua, FSLN (Sandinista) leader Daniel Ortega, who is usually placed in the category of radical anti-neoliberal left leaders, was elected. However, neither Ortega nor the FSLN were new, his party having languished in opposition for some twenty years.
There has been substantial concern about the increasingly authoritarian features of the most radical post-neoliberal regimes. In those cases where traditional party systems collapsed, social movements were initially the driving forces behind the emergence of new leaders and movements and their rise to power. However, despite claims by leaders that their regimes opened new avenues for participatory democracy, top down control of participatory channels appears to have become the norm except for Bolivia, where the leadership has remained responsive to its social movement base (Balderacchi, 2015) . Some argue that all of the radical anti-neoliberal regimes, with Venezuela under Chavez as the worst offender, have taken a marked authoritarian direction through such tactics as the use of constituent assemblies to perpetuate leaders in office, restrictions on the opposition, the weakening of institutional checks on power, and control of the media (Weyland, 2013; Sanchez-Sibony, 2013 ).
Judgements about the extent of deviation from Washington Consensus prescriptions, have generally reflected the radical/moderate categorization in political orientation noted above.
Castañeda (2006) identifies two "good" and "bad" species of left regimes. One is a reconstructed left (Uruguay, Chile and to a lesser extent, Brazil), which is respectful of the operation of liberal democracy and concerned with improving human welfare through increased spending on social programs; the other is a left with populist roots (Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina), which is harmful to Latin America because of lack of concern for economic performance and democratic values. Levitsky and Roberts (2011) present us with four categories of left regimes based on the extent of power concentration and party institutionalization (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011, p. 12) that separates out Bolivia because of the strong social movement base of the Morales regime, and
Argentina under Kirchner and Nicaragua under the FSLN as populist machine regimes.
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The distinction between moderate and radical regime categories suggests that the policies of the radical anti-neoliberal regimes must have deviated significantly more from Washington Consensus prescriptions than did the more moderate ones. However, there is little scholarly agreement on this point, particularly given that these regimes emerged when the Augmented Consensus was in full swing. According to one survey of the literature on post-neoliberalism in the region, there is no agreement on the meaning of the post-neoliberalism nor on whether there has been any meaningful departure from Washington Consensus policies on the part of any of these left regimes (except for Venezuela). At best, the only commonality among them is their commitment to break away in some form from the earlier neoliberal policy prescriptions (Ruckert, MacDonald and Proulx, 2017) .
Nevertheless, there were some important differences in the extent to which neoliberal policies were challenged, particularly in the area of privatization. over all gas and oil reserves being exploited by foreign investors to the state company, this move did not involve expropriation. Private companies were allowed to continue exploitation if they agreed to service contracts involving higher royalties and taxes. In a similar move in Ecuador, President Correa replaced production sharing agreements with foreign oil companies with a flat fee in exchange for the service of extracting, thereby ensuring that the state would reap all of the benefits of any price increase. Hence, in neither Bolivia nor Ecuador did nationalization mean actual state take-over of companies; rather, foreign companies could participate under arrangements that would maximize state revenue from resource exploitation.
There were many policy similarities among radical and moderate left regime policiespoints of commonality that generally coincide with the Augmented Washington Consensus.
There was a commitment to trade liberalization and while most rejected the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), a proposed agreement involving Latin America and the Caribbean (excluding Cuba) and the U.S., they pursued regional trade agreements. An exception was Argentina, which re-imposed import restrictions. All these regimes shared the objective of reducing poverty and inequality, problems largely addressed through increased social spending in health, education, new programs providing health coverage and pensions to cover informal sector workers, and programs targeted to the poorest and most excluded. While cash transfer programs originated with neoliberal regimes, they became key instruments of poverty reduction under post-neoliberalism in all cases. However, targeted social spending, particularly conditional cash transfer programs, also became the centerpieces of poverty alleviation in center/right regimes, such as Peru, Colombia and Mexico (Nagels, 2016; Rawlings, 2005) .
Another similarity among left post-neoliberal regimes identified in some accounts is the observation that left regimes did a much better job at maintaining macroeconomic stability than had pre-1980 left populist regimes, a commitment attributed to "lessons learned" from past macroeconomic crises (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2018; Heinrich and Tussie, 2009) In a departure from pre-1980s practices, increased social spending was supported by increased taxation, not by the printing of money or by acquiring debt as had occurred during the import substitution phase. While a few countries were able to carry out some tax reform, reducing taxes on the poor, and increasing taxes on personal wealth and unearned income (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2018, p.7) , most revenue for these expanded social programs came from increased taxes on commodity export earnings. Hence, leaders became deeply committed to resource extraction as necessary for social improvement and saw it as opening the way for structural transformation (Arsel, Hogenboom, & Pellegrini, 2016) . 8 Arguably, this strategy fit within the Washington Consensus given the Word Bank's support for resource extraction to increase revenue to reduce poverty.
A final commonality among left regimes, particularly among the most radical ones, and an issue related to their dependence on commodity exports, was the sharp conflicts they experienced with their private sectors. The rise of market liberalization, and the consequent growth in importance of the role of private investment would normally create a strong imperative to maintain business confidence, essential to sustain economic growth and employment.
However, for countries whose economic growth was sustained by strong demand for commodities, business reaction could be discounted to some extent and radical anti-business rhetoric and policies stepped up as long as resources from commodity exports flowed in. The most serious case of conflict with the private sector was that of Venezuela where the private sector was more unified and political polarization has been extreme, contributing to the depth of the economic crisis (Chiasson-LeBel, 2016) . The Bolivian and Ecuadorian regimes experienced conflict with their private sectors especially during the initial years in office (Wolff, 2016) . At the other end of the spectrum, Chile under the left/center coalition, the Concertación (later the New Majority) maintained generally co-operative arrangements with its private sector. Brazil's at times tense relations with its powerful private sector during the administrations of left Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff was sustained through generous government contracts along with financial support to the country's most powerful companies to expand into export markets.
Dependence on revenue from commodity exports generated other sources of political conflict, calling into question both the democratic and inclusionary claims of the most radical left regimes. Both Bolivia (under Evo Morales) and Ecuador (under Raphael Correa) instituted constitutional reform guaranteeing indigenous groups prior consultation on resource development and territorial rights (Kennemore & Weeks, 2011) . However, there has remained a notable gap between the aspirations set forth in constitutions and the reality on the ground, with rising resistance of indigenous communities to various resource development projects, resulting in violent clashes and the imprisonment of activists (Lalander, 2016) . Nevertheless, despite such problematic features, these left regimes did reduce poverty significantly and made inroads into the reduction of high levels of inequality (McLeod & Lustig, 2011, p. 6 ).
The Decline of Commodity Prices and the Resiliency of Neoliberalism
With the decline of commodity prices, fiscal deficits rose as commodity revenues decreased and governments continued to spend. The policy of expanding spending when growth and tax revenues are flush runs counter to Washington Consensus (neo-orthodox prescriptions)
insofar as this perspective views pro cyclical government spending as contrary to stabilization.
The prudent course for a commodity dependent exporter, according to the World Bank, is to save during the boom to compensate for loses during bad times as Chile did through allocating commodity windfalls to its Economic and Social Stabilization Fund. However, Bolivia under Evo Morales, also maintained a fiscal surplus until 2014 and saved part of the revenue obtained from its commodity boom.
For the region, the median public deficit reached 5.2 percent of GDP in 2015. Brazil, with a public deficit of 10.2 percent of GDP, and Argentina at 7.4% of GDP, have been the worst offenders (OECD/IDB, 2017, 1; World Bank, 2017, pp. 5, 21, 46) . In Brazil, the economy shrunk neoliberalism. China's increased demand for resource commodities was instrumental in stimulating the economic growth and providing the resources that made increased social spending and poverty reduction possible. Trade with China also provided some brief insulation from opposition forces-business and the political right. The fall in commodity prices, however, set the stage for a resurgence of the political right, its business supporters, and the re-introduction of some key aspects of the original Washington Consensus that had been abandoned by left leaders. At the same time, popular resistance to these policies, which has remained stubbornly resilient, continues, raising the specter of sharpening political polarization.
4 Eight Latin American countries now import more from China than they do from the United
States. The rise in manufactured imports from China has weakened manufacturing in the region.
5 Mexico and Central America, in contrast with most South American countries, did not achieve high rates of commodity export-driven growth during the post-neoliberal period. The nationalistic terms of the Mexican constitution (only altered in 2013) prevented foreign investment in the petroleum industry, thereby inhibiting resource-driven economic growth and the revenues that come with it. With a center right government, Mexico did not backtrack on market reform. However, it did expand support for the poor (part of the Augmented Washington Consensus) through its conditional cash transfer program and introduced social support for workers in the informal sector and for the elderly. 6 However, an important feature of the Costa Rican case was that its original market reform program had avoided key Washington Consensus recommendations, such as privatizations of the state-run social security system, telecommunications, and energy (Spalding, 2014, 201) .
7 Brazil, Uruguay, and Brazil are the institutionalized partisan left, while Venezuela under Chavez and Ecuador under Raphael Correa, are categorized as the new populist personalist left.
8 An exception was the case of Nicaragua, where social programs went forward despite poor economic performance due to President Ortega's alliance with Chavez and generous Venezuelan aid (Spalding, 2014, p. 216) .
9 Brazil has faced an ongoing and deep political crisis as well. Recession, rising inflation, and increased unemployment hit Brazil in 2014. Dilma Rousseff, who followed Lula in the Brazilian presidency in 2011, saw her approval ratings plummet as widespread protests against the government gained momentum. Meanwhile, accused of violation of budgetary laws, Rousseff was impeached and removed from power in a process that has been described in some quarters as
